The short-term debt choice under asymmetric information by Abad, David et al.
SERIEs (2017) 8:261–285
DOI 10.1007/s13209-017-0160-2
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The short-term debt choice under asymmetric
information
David Abad1 · Juan Pedro Sánchez-Ballesta2 ·
José Yagüe3
Received: 26 October 2016 / Accepted: 7 August 2017 / Published online: 1 September 2017
© The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract This paper investigates whether the market level of information asymmetry
affects firms’ debt financing decisions. Using a sample of non-financial listed firms
and a composite index based on microstructure measures of information asymmetry,
we find that firms with more information asymmetry use shorter debt maturities. In
addition, we find that these firms face more difficulties to access public debt and
bank debt (particularly, short-term bank debt), and they have to rely on trade credit
as an alternative source of short-term financing. Analyzing the associations in two
subsamples based on firm size, we find that our results essentially driven by smaller
companies, which are those affected by higher information asymmetries. Our findings
support the information asymmetry theories of trade credit: as information asymmetry
increases and, consequently, listed firms face more constraints in the credit markets,
they increase the use of financing provided by their suppliers.
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1 Introduction
The information environment of a firm, in general, and the level of information asym-
metry between better-informed insiders and less-informed investors, in particular,
plays a fundamental role in the financing decisions of firms. From the seminal work
of Myers and Majluf (1984), there is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature
showing that information asymmetry has important implications in firms’ financial
decisions, such as financing choices between debt and equity (Myers and Majluf 1984),
public and private debt (e.g. Leland and Pyle 1977; Diamond 1984; Fama 1985), debt
maturity choice (e.g. Flannery 1986; Barclay and Smith 1995; Berger et al. 2005),
and the choice between bank and non-bank debt (e.g. Johnson 1997; Anderson and
Makhija 1999).
Most papers on corporate finance that examine financing decisions focus on the
agency conflict between insiders and creditors, and they commonly use information
asymmetry proxies based on financial and accounting characteristics of the firm such
as size, growth options, or earnings opacity. More recently, some researchers have
been addressing financing questions by looking at information asymmetry proxies
from the trading process in the stock market (Bharath et al. 2009; Gao and Zhu 2015;
Shen 2014; Petacchi 2015). Market microstructure is the branch of literature providing
these measures which proxy the market perception of the information advantage held
by insiders and the adverse selection risk faced by outsiders (Bharath et al. 2009).
In this paper, we follow the market microstructure approximation to examine
an empirical question that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been previously
addressed: whether the information asymmetry concerning firms’ market valuation
affects their short-term financing structure. To do so, we focus on the Spanish case,
a market with high levels of short-term debt combined with a bank-oriented financial
system. We analyze whether the degree of information asymmetry associated with a
firm affects the choice between the different alternative sources of short-term private
debt financing, i.e., bank debt and trade credit. In addition, since the choice of short-
term financing may be determined by restrictions in the public debt market and/or
in the long-term private debt market, we also analyze the influence of information
asymmetries on debt maturity, public debt and long-term bank debt.
Previous financial research shows the significance of adverse selection costs in debt
maturity choices by firms. A great number of studies find that firms with higher infor-
mation asymmetries show shorter debt maturities (Barclay and Smith 1995; Stohs and
Mauer 1996; Scherr and Hulburt 2001; Berger et al. 2005). These findings validate the
empirical predictions of Flannery’s (1986) and Diamond’s (1991) theoretical models:
(1) firms with larger levels of information asymmetries and favorable private informa-
tion are more likely to issue short-term debt because they can obtain this debt at a low
interest rate and roll it over (Berger et al. 2005). (2) Under asymmetric information,
short-term debt facilitates monitoring, because lenders can refuse or modify the terms
of the loans, which is particularly important in financing supplied by banks (Diamond
1991; Magri 2010).
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Focusing on the different types of short-term financing, extensive examples in
the literature show that one of its main determinants is the adverse selection and
moral hazard problems due to the information asymmetry faced by lenders. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) and De Andrés Alonso et al. (2005) hypothesize that
companies’ access to bank financing differs in market-based and bank-based financial
systems. In market-based financial systems, firms with higher information asymmetry
use more bank debt than public debt (e.g. Johnson 1997; Anderson and Makhija 1999;
Denis and Mihov 2003). Due to their closer relationship with the firms, banks and other
private lenders are more effective at monitoring borrowers, and consequently have an
informational advantage over lenders in the public debt market (Leland and Pyle
1977; Diamond 1984; Fama 1985). Hence, firms with a higher degree of information
asymmetry will borrow privately, while firms with lower information asymmetry will
prefer public debt (Denis and Mihov 2003).
On the contrary, in a bank-based financial system, most firms deal almost exclu-
sively with financial intermediaries and the possibility of substituting market debt for
bank debt is limited to a very few large firms. In this context, an increase in the infor-
mation asymmetry can impair the access to bank debt (De Andrés Alonso et al. 2005;
García-Teruel et al. 2014b) and create bank credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
Consequently, there is an incentive for constrained firms to use more trade credit as
a short-term financing alternative, since suppliers might be better skilled at overcom-
ing informational asymmetries and enforcement problems than financial institutions
(Love 2011).
Several theoretical papers support the relationship between bank credit rationing
and trade credit driven by information asymmetries (e.g. Smith 1987; Biais and Gollier
1997; Jain 2001; Burkart and Ellingsen 2004). According to the implications of these
papers, suppliers can provide trade credit to firms when institutional credit is not
available since suppliers present advantages over banks and other lenders: (1) suppliers
can obtain better information on the borrower’s creditworthiness than banks, (2) they
face lower monitoring costs, (3) they can control the debtor better through the delivery
of goods supplied, and (4) they can liquidate assets more efficiently (Petersen and Rajan
1997). Consistently, the majority of the empirical evidence finds that firms increase
their demand for trade credit to overcome financial constraints and that suppliers may
act as liquidity providers in situations of credit rationing (e.g. Petersen and Rajan
1997; Nilsen 2002; Danielson and Scott 2004; Cuñat 2007; Garcia-Appendini and
Montoriol-Garriga 2013). Accordingly, we hypothesize that information asymmetry
among investors is positively (negatively) related to the level of trade credit (short-term
bank debt).
In corporate finance, information asymmetry refers to the notion that insiders, typ-
ically the managers, know more about the quality and value of their firm’s assets than
outsiders do. This asymmetry creates the possibility that the market will not price
the firm’s claims correctly (Klein et al. 2002) and the insiders take advantage of the
firm’s misvaluation. Since measuring information asymmetry is a difficult task, stud-
ies on financial decisions have used different proxies such as the amount of growth
options in a firm’s investment opportunity set (Barclay and Smith 1995), firm size
(Stohs and Mauer 1996; Scherr and Hulburt 2001), risk ratings (Berger et al. 2005),
and accounting quality (Bharath et al. 2008; García-Teruel et al. 2014a, b). However,
123
264 SERIEs (2017) 8:261–285
stock markets play an important role in the transmission of useful information to
creditors (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999) since stock prices partially reveal
information that is in the possession of informed traders.
In the market microstructure literature it is well recognized that, when people trade,
there are some participants with better information (informed traders) than others
(uninformed traders) about the fundamental value of the asset. In fact, firm managers
and insiders are typically considered as informed agents. Market microstructure lit-
erature has proposed different measures to capture the adverse selection faced by an
uninformed investor when trading a stock, and thus proxy for the information asym-
metry level of the firm. As Bharath et al. (2009) point out, market microstructure
measures of information asymmetry are proxies for the financial markets’ perception
of the information advantage held by firm insiders and the adverse selection risk borne
by outsiders.1 On this basis, recent empirical research has used market microstructure
proxies for adverse selection to analyze whether the capital structure of firms is driven
by asymmetric information (i.e., Agarwal and O’Hara 2007; Bharath et al. 2009; Shen
2014; Gao and Zhu 2015). Thus, Bharath et al. (2009) document a positive relationship
between information asymmetry and leverage, and Shen (2014) finds that firms have
more difficulties to access public debt as the level of information asymmetry increases.
However, whereas these papers have focused mainly on capital structure to test the
pecking order theory, in this paper we use this approximation to deal with a fundamen-
tal question in bank-based financial countries and which has scarcely been examined
by the prior literature on listed companies: the effect of information asymmetries on
debt structure, and particularly, on the short-term financing decision.
In order to capture the extent of information asymmetry, we use a composite index
based on market microstructure measures estimated from high frequency data: the
bid-ask spread, the illiquidity measure developed in Amihud (2002), the price impact
introduced by Huang and Stoll (1996), the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN)
of Easley et al. (1996), and the new Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed
Trading (VPIN) of Easley et al. (2012). With the index of information asymmetry, we
extract the common variation in these information asymmetry proxies, so minimizing
the possibility that these measures are driven by factors other than adverse selection
(such as inventory costs, transactions costs, monopoly rents, etc.).
To test our hypothesis, we use a panel of non-financial firms listed in the Spanish
Stock Exchange (SIBE) for the period 2001–2008.2 Spain is classified as a code law
country characterized by weak investor protection, a high concentration of ownership
and a less developed capital market than Anglo-Saxon countries (La Porta et al. 1998;
Faccio and Lang 2002). Moreover, Spain is a clear example of a country with a
1 Bharath et al. (2009) affirm that the market microstructure measures of information asymmetry are more
desirable than those provided by corporate finance literature. On one hand, the literature documents that
market microstructure measures are sensitive to a wide array of potentially informative corporate events
(earnings, dividends, takeovers, etc.) and firm characteristics (credit rating, ownership structure, etc.). On
the other hand, corporate finance proxies (firm size, analyst’s coverage, etc.) are often inconsistent, as well
as inherently static and persistent, having multiple and often ad hoc interpretations.
2 In terms of market capitalization and trading volume, the Spanish Stock Exchange was one of the largest
stock markets in 2005, midpoint of our sample period (see the 2006 World Federation of Exchanges annual
report: http://www.world-exchanges.org/insight/reports/2006-wfe-annual-report).
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banking-oriented financial system in which few firms issue public debt (basically listed
companies) and where banks and suppliers are the main sources for firm financing
(Schmidt and Tyrell 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2002). In contrast to US
firms, Spanish companies present a very different debt maturity structure showing
higher levels of short-term debt. According to the data from Central de Balances
del Banco de España (CBBE), the mean value of short-term debt over total debt
was 57.6% in 2008 for Spanish firms, much higher than the 21% presented by US
companies (Datta et al. 2005).3 Moreover, short-term debt financing and trade credit
have significant relevance in the Spanish financial system. In particular, trade credit in
Spanish firms is one of the highest in Europe (Marotta 2005) representing 23.7% of
total debt and 41.2% of total short-term debt in 2008 (according to the data provided
by CBBE).
Our findings show that market microstructure measures of information asymmetry
explain debt structure and, in particular, short-term debt financing decisions of listed
firms. Our results reveal that information asymmetry in the stock market reduces firms’
debt maturity, i.e., firms face more restrictions to obtain long term debt. In addition,
firms with higher informational asymmetries face more difficulties in accessing public
debt and bank debt, in particular short-term bank debt. Thus, in their choice between
short-term financing sources, they have to rely on account payables as an alterna-
tive source of financing to overcome the financial constraints induced by information
asymmetry problems.
Since firm size is a commonly considered proxy for the quantity and quality of infor-
mation available about a firm (e.g., Barry and Brown 1984; Atiase 1985; Bhushan 1989;
Bhattacharya et al. 2013), we further investigate the effects of information asymmetry
on short-term financing by splitting our sample into small and large firms. We find that
information asymmetry is a significant determinant both of the level of short-term debt
and the types of financing sources for small firms (characterized by a poorer infor-
mation environment). Hence, for smaller listed firms, we find a negative association
between information asymmetry and financial funds obtained in the credit markets
(public and bank debt), and that the relevance of trade credit enhances as information
asymmetries increases. For larger listed firms, we also find a positive relationship
between information asymmetry and the weight of trade credit within the short-term
debt. However, our findings suggest that financing decisions are less sensitive to infor-
mation asymmetry in larger listed firms, probably because the information asymmetry
problem is not as severe as in smaller firms.
Our paper contributes to the literature by examining the implications for corpo-
rate decisions of information asymmetry in the equity market. Specifically, our paper
extends the strand of empirical papers that use measures from market microstructure
literature to explain firm’s capital structure decisions (Agarwal and O’Hara 2007;
Bharath et al. 2009; Shen 2014; Gao and Zhu 2015). Unlike these studies, we do not
examine the firm’s decision to issue debt or equity when raising capital, but we focus
on the debt structure, and particularly on the short-term financing decision. Thus, we
3 Central de Balances del Banco de España (Central Balance Sheet Data Office of Bank of Spain) is
a division of the Statistics Department of the Spanish central bank, which publishes the annual series of
financial information (balance sheets, income statements, ratios, etc.) of Spanish non-financial corporations.
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analyze how information asymmetry affects debt maturity, the choice between public
and private debt, and the firm’s short term debt financing decision between bank debt
and trade credit. As a consequence, from an informational perspective, our paper con-
tributes to the financial literature concerning the firm’s choice of short-term financial
sources. Our findings suggest a substitutive relationship between trade credit and bank
credit, which is consistent with the information asymmetry theories of trade credit.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the measure of
information asymmetry, model specifications, and the sample. Section 3 reports the
empirical results and the final section concludes the paper.
2 Research design
2.1 Measuring information asymmetry
In contrast to the corporate finance measures based on firm characteristics, market
microstructure literature has proposed measures of information asymmetry that cap-
ture financial market perception about adverse selection risk, which arises from the
presence of informed traders. Since information asymmetry is not directly observ-
able, all measures proposed could be considered as imperfect or incomplete proxies
of the adverse selection between informed and uninformed traders. To obtain a more
complete information asymmetry measure, prior studies apply principal component
analysis to individual proxies to enhance the final measurement (e.g. Bharath et al.
2009). We follow this approach and create an adverse selection index (ASY, here-
after) from five individual measures developed by market microstructure literature:
the relative bid-ask spread, the illiquidity measure developed in Amihud (2002), the
price impact introduced by Huang and Stoll (1996), the PIN, and the VPIN. Next, we
describe the calculation of the five components of the index.
Bid-ask spread is a measure of trading costs (liquidity), which is commonly used to
proxy for information asymmetry as it compensates liquidity providers for transacting
with better-informed traders (Glosten and Milgrom 1985). We calculate the relative
quoted spread, RQS, which is the difference between the bid and ask quotes in time t
scaled by the quote mid-point. First, we computed RQS on a daily basis by averaging
(time-weighted) all the observations within the day. Following that, we obtain an
annual RQS by averaging (equally-weighted) daily values.
Since adverse selection is an important determinant of stock liquidity, we estimate
the index of illiquidity introduced by Amihud (2002), which is a volume-based liq-
uidity indicator (AMH, hereafter). This measure reflects the average of the daily price
impact of the order flow. When a stock is liquid, large trading volumes provoke small
price changes. Therefore, higher values of AMH indicate higher price movements in
response to trading volume and thus, higher stock illiquidity. It is expected that the
greater the information asymmetry, the worse the stock liquidity, and the higher the
AMH and RQS values.
We also include the measure of price impact (PI) developed by Huang and Stoll
(1996), PI is the permanent price change or information content of a trade, which is
estimated based on the differences in the true economic value of the security (proxied
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by the quote mid-point) before and after the transaction. As Huang and Stoll (1996),
we calculate the price impact over a 30-min interval. A daily PI is computed in trade-
time by averaging (volume-weighted) all the trades within the day. Then, we obtain
an annual value by averaging (equally weighted) all the trading days within the year.
A large and positive PI indicates a high frequency of information-based trades.
The fourth and fifth constituents of our index, the well-known PIN and the novel
VPIN, directly infer the information content of the trading process from the com-
putation of order imbalances between buys and sells. The PIN is the unconditional
probability that a randomly selected trade originates from an informed trader. Conse-
quently, the higher PIN value, the greater is a firm’s extent of information asymmetry.
The original PIN model was introduced by Easley et al. (1996). We estimate first
the PIN model via maximum likelihood per stock and month. The use of 1-month
transaction data should be wide enough to produce reliable estimates and allows us to
maximize the number of estimations.4 Finally, we calculate an annual PIN by averag-
ing monthly values.
As an update of the PIN model, Easley et al. (2012) have developed a new measure
for adverse selection risk called VPIN. In particular, VPIN measures order flow toxic-
ity, which can be considered as a broader concept for adverse selection applied to the
particular world of liquidity providers in a high frequency trading (HFT) environment.
However, VPIN can be considered as a more flexible measure of asymmetric informa-
tion that can be applied in a wide range of frameworks by choosing the appropriate
values of the variables involved in its computation (Abad and Yagüe 2012). There are
three relevant variables in the VPIN approach: time bar, volume bucket and sample
length.5 At bar level, trade flow is split between buys and sells. At bucket level, order
imbalances are computed. Finally, order imbalances are smoothed in the sample length
by computing a moving average and the VPIN series is obtained. An annual VPIN is
computed by averaging all the values of the result VPIN series into the year.
2.2 Model specification
To study the influence of the level of information asymmetry in the market on the debt
financing decisions of the firm, we run several regressions modeling each of the proxies
for the debt financing choices as a function of the level of information asymmetry:
DebtT ype = β0 + β1 ASY +
∑
j
β j Controls + ε (1)
where the dependent variable DebtType represents different debt ratios that capture the
external financing choice of firms, and which are described below; ASY is the index
of information asymmetry, and Controls represents the control variables included in
the models.
4 Easley et al. (1997) indicate that a 30 trading-day window ensures sufficient trade observations for the PIN
estimation procedure. Akay et al. (2012) use 20 trading days to estimate PIN finding numerical solutions
for all their estimations.
5 For an accurate description of the procedure, see the original paper of Easley et al. (2012). For a numeric
example of this procedure, see Abad and Yagüe (2012).
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Firstly, we consider the effect of information asymmetry on the term of the debt,
so we define as dependent variable the ratio of short-term debt to total debt, SHTDBT.
We consider as short-term that debt, regardless of its type, which has a maturity of up
to 1 year. According to the literature on debt maturity structure, we expect a positive
association between ASY and SHTDBT, since, from a borrower perspective, firms
facing high information asymmetries and with good private credit quality, can obtain
better conditions when renewing their short-term debt, and, from a lender perspective,
short-term debt facilitates the monitoring of firms with high information asymmetry.
As a second analysis, and although not many firms, mainly the larger ones, issue
public debt in Spain, we are interested in the choice between public and private debt.
Thus, we define our second dependent variable PBLDBT as the ratio of public debt to
total debt, and we expect a negative coefficient on ASY in the model of PBLDBT. Since
private lenders have more access to private information, superior ability to monitoring
firms, and more flexibility in designing contracts than public lenders (Leland and Pyle
1977; Diamond 1984; Fama 1985; Bharath et al. 2008), we expect that firms with
higher information asymmetries in the capital market will have more difficulties in
obtaining public debt and thus will have to rely on private debt (Denis and Mihov
2003; De Andrés Alonso et al. 2005).
Once analyzed the influence of ASY on the term of the debt (short/long) and the type
of market debt, public and private, we are interested in examining how information
asymmetry influences the access to debt in the private debt market. In the subsequent
analyses we study the association between ASY and bank debt, on one hand, and trade
credit, on the other. We define our third dependent variable BNKDBT as the ratio
of bank debt over total debt, and then we decompose BNKDBT into long-term and
short-term bank debt. LNGBNK, our fourth dependent variable, is the ratio of long-
term bank debt over total debt; SHTBNK, our fifth dependent variable, is the ratio
of short-term bank debt to total debt; and ACCPAY, our sixth dependent variable, is
the ratio of accounts payable to total debt. As a final analysis to examine in depth
the firm’s choice of short-term financial sources under asymmetric information, we
define our seventh dependent variable, TRDCRD, as the ratio of accounts payable to
the sum of short-term bank debt plus accounts payable. Based on information asym-
metry theories of trade credit, if firms with higher information asymmetries face bank
credit rationing they will use more trade credit instead (Smith 1987; Biais and Gollier
1997). Thus, we expect negative coefficients on ASY in the BNKDBT, LNGBNK, and
SHTBNK regressions,6 as well as positive coefficients on ASY in the ACCPAY and
TRDCRD regressions.
Following previous studies, we include several controls in our models in order
to take into account the influence of size, leverage, internal funds, asset maturity,
growth options, collateral, solvency, and income volatility (Petersen and Rajan 1997;
Danielson and Scott 2004; Bharath et al. 2009; Magri 2010): SIZE is the logarithm
of sales; LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total debt over total assets; CFOTA
is the ratio of cash flow (net income plus depreciation) over total assets. LAM is the
6 There is also the possibility that higher information asymmetry leads to a reduction in the term of bank
debt, with an increase in short-term bank debt and a reduction in long-term bank debt but without bank
credit rationing. In this case, the coefficient on BNKDBT would be non-significant.
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logarithm of asset maturity; BTM is the book-to-market ratio; TANG is the ratio of
tangible fixed assets over assets. Z is the re-estimated Altman Z-score by Begley et al.
(1996). σ (ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets from t − 2 to t . Finally,
we include dummy variables to control for industry and year effects.
2.3 Sample and data
Our sample is made up of stocks traded on the electronic trading platform of the Spanish
Stock Exchange, known as the SIBE (Sistema de Interconexión Bursátil Español).
The SIBE is an order-driven market where liquidity is provided by an open limit order
book. Trading is continuous from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. There are two regular call
auctions each day: the first one determines the opening price (8:30–9:00 a.m.), and the
second sets the official closing price (5:30–5:35 p.m.). Three basic types of orders are
allowed: limit, market, and market-to-limit orders. In the continuous session, a trade
occurs whenever an incoming order matches one or more orders on the opposite side
of the limit order book. Orders submitted that are not instantaneously executed are
stored in the book according to a strict price-time priority rule. Unexecuted orders can
always be cancelled and modified. Continuous trading may be temporally interrupted
since a system of stock-specific intraday price limits and short-lived call auctions
is implemented to handle unusual volatility levels. In all auctions (open, close and
volatility) orders can be submitted, modified or cancelled, but no trades occur.
Trade and quote data for this study come from SM data files provided by Sociedad
de Bolsas, S.A. SM files comprise detailed time-stamped information about the first
level of the limit order book for each stock listed on the SIBE. Any trade, order
submission or cancellation affecting best prices in the book generate a new record.
The distinction between buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades is straightforward,
without the need to use a classification algorithm. Firms’ financial statement data are
obtained from the SABI database, made by Bureau Van Dijk, and the annual accounts
stored at the registration files of Spanish Securities Market Commission (Comisión
Nacional del Mercado de Valores, CNMV). Institutional ownership and analysts’ data
come from Thomson Reuters Eikon Datastream.
The initial sample consists of all non-financial firms listed on the main segment
of the SIBE in the period 2001–2008. After applying the usual filters to detect and
eliminate errors in the preparation of the intraday trading data and the financial data,
we consider those firm-year observations for which we have been able to collect
debt figures, the information asymmetry measures and the control variables. The final
sample consists of 100 firms and 543 firm-year observations.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Information asymmetry index properties
Table 1 presents a summary of ASY, our proxy for the risk of adverse selection among
investors. Panel A reports mean value, standard deviation and percentiles 10, 50 and
90% for the five constituents and the index. The mean (median) of relative bid-ask
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Table 1 Information asymmetry index
N Mean SD 10th perc. Median 90th perc.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
RQS 543 0.0064 0.0062 0.0013 0.0042 0.0143
AMH 543 0.2802 1.9275 0.0005 0.0084 0.3382
PI 543 0.0038 0.0028 0.0011 0.0030 0.0076
PIN 542 0.1885 0.0608 0.1218 0.1787 0.2645
VPIN 543 0.2017 0.1230 0.0731 0.1719 0.3595
ASY 542 0.0000 1.7868 −1.8772 −0.4015 2.4043
ASY between 100 1.6980
ASY within 5.42 0.7552
ASY RQS AMH PI PIN VPIN
Panel B: Correlation matrix
ASY 1
RQS 0.9150*** 1
AMH 0.4579*** 0.3031*** 1
PI 0.8445*** 0.9171*** 0.2066*** 1
PIN 0.8305*** 0.6087*** 0.3456*** 0.5107***
VPIN 0.8618*** 0.6875*** 0.3141*** 0.5579*** 0.7796*** 1
Panel A reports descriptive statistics of market microstructure measures of information asymmetry used in
this study. RQS is the relative quote bid-ask spread. AMH is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002). PI
is the price impact measure proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996). PIN is Probability of Informed Trading
based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. VPIN is Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading
developed in Easley et al. (2012). ASY is the composite index of information asymmetry based on the
former measures of information asymmetry (RQS, AMH, PI, PIN, and VPIN). ASY between and ASY within
show the between firm and within firm standard deviations of ASY, respectively. Panel B reports correlation
coefficients between the composite index of information asymmetry and the constituents of the index used
in this study. *** Denotes significance levels at two-tail tests of 1%
spread (RQS) is 0.64% (0.42%). The mean value of AMH in our sample (0.28) is
similar to that reported by Amihud (2002). The average (median) of price impact
measure (PI) is 0.38% (0.30%). The probability of informed trading (PIN) shows a
mean (median) value of around 19% (18%). These PIN values are consistent with
those reported in prior studies (e.g. Brown and Hillegeist 2007). The VPIN shows a
similar mean value to the PIN.
In order to isolate the common adverse selection component underlying the five
proxies we construct an index of information asymmetry (ASY) using principal com-
ponent analysis across firm-years for the whole sample. The mean of ASY is zero (by
construction) and its median is −0.40. The statistical distributions of the above mea-
sures show that there are clear differences in the degree of asymmetric information
between the firms included in our sample. Moreover, in ASY between and ASY within
rows we report the between firm (1.70) and within firm (0.76) standard deviations of
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ASY, respectively.7 These values show that the main source of variation in our sample
is between firms, so in the following analyses we are interested in examining how debt
financing is affected by cross-sectional differences in information asymmetry, proxied
by ASY. The first (and only) factor with an eigenvalue greater than one explains 64.3%
of the variance and each component of ASY enters with positive sign and weights as
follows:
ASY = 0.513RQS + 0.258AM H + 0.470P I + 0.465P I N + 0.483V P I N (2)
Therefore, each proxy for information asymmetry plays its role in the index. A higher
value of the index means a higher level of information asymmetry. Panel B of Table 1
provides the Pearson correlation matrix between the constituents of the index and
the index itself. All the information asymmetry proxies are positively correlated with
each other indicating that these measures are likely to be driven by adverse selec-
tion, although each contains unique information. Moreover, the index is positively
and significantly correlated with each information asymmetry variable, varying from
a correlation of 92% between ASY and RQS to a correlation of 46% between ASY and
AMH. Moreover, correlations between each of the five proxies for information asym-
metry and the index are generally higher than the correlations between each other,
suggesting that the index is a parsimonious measure of information asymmetry.
We also analyse whether our index is consistent with several firm characteristics
commonly used to measure the degree of firms’ information asymmetry by the cor-
porate finance literature. In particular, as seen in Table 2, we sort firms by ASY in
quintiles (in levels and annual variations) and report the average values of five firm
characteristics (assets, sales, age, analysts’ coverage and institutional ownership) in
each quintile of ASY. In addition, we obtain Spearman rank correlations and the linear
regression slope coefficients relating ASY with the corporate finance proxies. Prior
literature has provided extensive evidence showing that larger and older firms, as well
as firms more followed by analysts and with higher levels of institutional ownership,
suffer lower information asymmetry problems. As seen in Panel A, the average values
of these firm characteristics decrease as we move to higher adverse selection quintiles.
The negative and significant values of correlations and slope coefficients corroborate
the expected inverse relationship between the composite index and firm characteristics
considered as typical proxies for information asymmetries. When we look at the results
in terms of year-on-year fluctuations (Panel B), we observe that the relationship does
not follow any systematic behaviour and that the correlation and slope coefficients
become insignificant.
In short, Table 2 suggests that (1) the composite index is valid to test whether
the information asymmetry problems affect capital structure decisions, and (2) the
variability of corporate finance measures affecting information asymmetry comes from
7 In our analyses we use annual values of our proxies for information asymmetry. We have also calculated
monthly values of them. The variation of these measures within firms and between firms at the monthly
basis is similar to that observed at the annual basis. For instance, the standard deviation of ASY between
firms is 1.43 and within firms is 0.88 by using monthly data.
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Table 2 Accounting and firm environment variables across adverse selection quintiles
Quintile Assets Sales Age Analysts Inst_own
Panel A: ASY based quintiles
1 16.15 15.49 3.76 19.5 0.17
2 14.68 13.96 3.62 11.84 0.12
3 14.09 13.75 3.70 8.79 0.14
4 13.21 12.79 3.58 6.69 0.13
5 12.60 12.18 3.40 4.14 0.11
r −0.71*** −0.68*** −0.13*** −0.73*** −0.26***
bO L S −0.58*** −0.54*** −0.44*** −0.15*** −3.08***
Panel B: ΔASY based quintiles
1 13.57 13.14 3.54 6.87 0.13
2 14.59 14.10 3.83 11.66 0.15
3 14.81 14.23 3.66 13.47 0.16
4 14.75 14.31 3.75 13.58 0.15
5 13.42 12.97 3.52 7.54 0.12
r 0.004 0.008 −0.011 0.042 −0.062
bO L S −0.006 −0.002 0.002 −0.2e−3 −0.34
This table reports means of various firm characteristics for each adverse selection quintile. Assets is the
logarithm of total assets. Sales is the logarithm of sales. Age is the logarithm of the numbers of years since
the inception. Analysts is the number of analysts following a firm. Inst_own is the percentage of shares
owned by institutional shareholders. r and bO L S are the Spearman rank correlation and linear regression
coefficient, respectively, between the corresponding variable and either ASY or ΔASY based rankings.
*** Denotes significance levels at two-tail tests of 1%
the cross-section (among firms) rather than from the relative change in each company
(within firms). These findings are consistent with those in Bharath et al. (2009).
3.2 Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the dependent (Panel A) and control variables
(Panel B), showing their mean values, standard deviations and percentiles 10, 50
and 90%. The mean (median) of SHTDBT is 59.41% (57.68%), which shows the
relevance of short-term debt in Spanish listed firms. PBLDBT has a mean and a median
of 6.15 and 0%, respectively. The median value is zero because only 184 firm-year
observations (33% of our sample) issue public debt. This is consistent with the notion
that the Spanish capital market is dominated by private (bank and non-bank) debt
providers (Ojah and Manrique, 2005:455), and that few firms resort to public debt
issuances in order to obtain external financing. Within the private debt, the mean
(median) of BNKDBT is 38.16% (37.84%), with the weight of long-term bank debt
over total debt being higher than that of short-term bank debt. Thus, LNGBNK shows
a mean (median) value of 21.30% (19.09%), whereas the mean (median) of SHTBNK
is 16.87% (11.73%).
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of dependent and control variables
N Mean SD 10th perc. Median 90th perc.
Panel A: Financing measures
SHTDBT 543 0.5941 0.2129 0.3100 0.5768 0.8964
PBLDBT 543 0.0615 0.1213 0.0000 0.0000 0.2774
BNKDBT 543 0.3816 0.2122 0.0753 0.3784 0.6462
LNGBNK 543 0.2130 0.1645 0.0080 0.1909 0.4468
SHTBNK 543 0.1687 0.1571 0.0238 0.1173 0.3721
ACCPAY 543 0.2733 0.1736 0.0836 0.2379 0.5102
TRDCRD 543 0.6202 0.2431 0.3007 0.6208 0.9353
Panel B: Control variables
LEV 543 0.6179 0.1859 0.3398 0.6431 0.8374
SIZE 543 13.6285 1.8589 11.5475 13.6947 16.0709
CFOTA 543 0.0772 0.0825 0.0312 0.0764 0.1527
LAM 543 1.8195 0.9112 0.7979 1.7848 2.8430
BTM 543 0.6278 0.4868 0.1795 0.5551 1.2171
TANG 543 0.3461 0.2157 0.0696 0.3204 0.6339
Z 543 0.4997 0.5479 0.2152 0.4254 0.8031
σ (ROA) 543 0.0265 0.0304 0.0046 0.0159 0.0611
This table reports descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the present study. SHTDBT is the ratio
of short-term debt to total debt. PBLDBT is the ratio of public debt to total debt. BNKDEBT is the ratio of
bank debt to total debt. LNGBNK is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total debt. SHTBNK is the ratio of
short-term bank debt to total debt. ACCPAY is the ratio of accounts payable to total debt. TRDCRD is the
ratio of accounts payable to the sum of short-term bank debt plus accounts payable. LEV is the total debt
over total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of sales. CFOTA is the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets.
LAM is the logarithm of asset maturity. BTM is the logarithm of the book-to-market value of equity ratio.
TANG is the ratio of net equipment and gross plants to total assets. Z is the re-estimated Altman Z-score
by Begley et al. (1996). σ (ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets from t − 2 to t
Regarding the other component of private debt, ACCPAY represents, on average
(median), 27.33% (23.79%) of total debt. Therefore, the financing provided by sup-
pliers is the main source of the short-term financing of our sample’s firms. This result
is in line with the evidence reported in the majority of developed and industrialized
countries, where the volume of trade credit exceeds the volume of short-term bank
debt (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1995). TRDCRD mean value of 62.02% confirms the
importance of trade credit in the short-term financing of our sample. These values are
consistent with those reported in prior studies (e.g., García-Teruel et al. 2014a). With
regard to control variables, the significant level of dispersion in the values of these
variables reflects the heterogeneity of our firm-year sample.
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix between the variables used in the
analyses. As seen, SHTDBT is negatively correlated with PBLDBT and BNKDBT (at
the 1% level), which is consistent with the fact that public debt and bank debt of Spanish
non-financial listed firms are mainly long-term financing. SHTDBT is also positively
correlated with SHTBNK and ACCPAY (at the 1% level), respectively. These two
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alternatives of short-term financing, SHTBANK and ACCPAY, are negatively associated
with each other (at the 1% level), which suggests that they may be substitutive financial
choices. The results also show that bigger firms and more indebted firms use more
public debt and less short-term debt (at the 1% level). Likewise, we do not detect
high correlations between independent variables, which suggests that there are no
multicollinearity problems.
Our proxy for information asymmetry (ASY) shows a positive and significant asso-
ciation with SHTDEBT at the 1% level. Additionally, ASY is negatively correlated
with PBLDT and LNGBNK (at 1% level and 5% level, respectively). This suggests
that when the level of information asymmetry increases, firms have more difficulties
to access the public debt market and long-term financing from banks. On the contrary,
the two types of short-term debt (SHTBNK and ACCPAY) are significantly and posi-
tively correlated with the level of information asymmetry, which suggests that under
information asymmetry firms have to rely on short-term financing sources. Neverthe-
less, firm size shows a significant negative correlation with SHTBNK (at the 1% level)
and it is not significantly correlated with ACCPAY. At the same time, as expected, the
correlation between SIZE and ASY is −0.553, significant at the 1% level, which is con-
sistent with prior studies that show that small firms have usually a poorer information
environment than larger firms (e.g. Chung et al. 1995; Lakonishok and Lee 2001).
Since extensive research suggests that there are systematic differences in the infor-
mation environment depending on firm’s size, we classify firms into small and large
firms splitting the sample by the median of SIZE. Table 5 presents the descriptive statis-
tics of the main variables for small and large firms. We find significant differences in the
variables regarding financing sources and the level of information asymmetry between
these two groups of firms. Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Bougheas et al. 2006),
small firms tend to have a higher percentage of short-term debt than larger firms. In
our sample, the mean of SHTDBT is 65.15% in small firms, whereas the average of
this variable in large firms is 53.70%, and this difference is significant at the 1% level.
In addition, larger firms present significant higher levels of public debt, PBLDBT,
than small ones (10.68 vs. 1.33%). On the contrary, the percentage of bank debt, and
particularly short-term bank debt, over total debt is significantly higher in small firms
than in larger ones.Within short-term financing sources, ACCPAY is more relevant in
small firms than in large firms (28.6 vs. 26.1%), with this difference being significant
at the 10% level. Due to the lower values of SHTBNK in large firms in comparison to
small firms, TRDCRD is higher in larger firms (67.6 vs. 56.4%), a difference which is
significant at the 1% level.
Summarizing, these results suggest that larger firms can obtain debt financing from
the capital market, mainly long-term, and thus need less long-term financial funds from
banks. In contrast, smaller firms have more difficulties to access the public debt market
and also to obtain long-term financing in the private debt market, so their main external
financing sources consists in short-term bank debt and accounts payable. Finally, as
expected, large firms present significant lower levels of information asymmetry than
small firms at the 1% level, and ASY shows a lower dispersion in the subsample of
large firms than in the small ones.
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Table 5 Differences between small and large firms
Small Large Difference
#obs. Mean SD #obs. Mean SD Mean
SHTDBT 271 0.6515 0.1994 272 0.5370 0.2109 0.115***
PBLDBT 271 0.0133 0.0508 272 0.1068 0.1499 −0.093***
BNKDBT 271 0.4241 0.2231 272 0.3393 0.1920 0.085***
LNGBNK 271 0.1995 0.1661 272 0.2264 0.1621 −0.027*
SHTBNK 271 0.2245 0.1765 272 0.1129 0.1099 0.112***
ACCPAY 271 0.2858 0.1712 272 0.2609 0.1754 0.025*
TRDCRD 271 0.5644 0.2499 272 0.6759 0.2232 −0.112***
ASY 271 1.0228 1.8189 271 −1.0228 0.9941 2.046***
This table presents the descriptive statistics of short-financing and information asymmetry variables and
the differences in these variables among small and large firms. We define as small firms those where SIZE
has a value lower (higher) than its median. Variable definitions are in Tables 1 and 3. The t test is used
to test the null hypothesis of no significant differences in each information asymmetry proxy between two
subsamples. *, **, and *** Denote significance levels at two-tail tests of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively
3.3 Multivariate analyses
We assess the association between information asymmetry and debt financing through
seven OLS regressions with clustered (Rogers) standard errors at the firm level
(Petersen 2009), robust both to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation,
as described in model (1). Table 6 reports the results for the whole sample for the
different debt type ratios used as dependent variables.
In column 1 of Table 6 we find that the coefficient on ASY is positive and statistically
significant (1% level) as a determinant of SHTDBT, suggesting that higher information
asymmetry is significantly associated with higher levels of short-term debt once we
control for other variables. This finding is consistent not only with prior research based
on the traditional proxies for information asymmetry from corporate finance literature
(e.g. Barclay and Smith 1995; Cuñat 1999; Berger et al. 2005; García-Teruel et al.
2010; González Méndez 2013), but also with the findings in Gao and Zhu (2015)
employing measures from market microstructure. With regard to control variables,
similar to prior evidence, firms with higher leverage show less proportion of short-
term debt (at the 1% level), whereas those firms that generate more cash flows show a
higher proportion of short-term debt (at the 5% level). In addition, and also consistent
with prior research, we find that firms with longer asset maturities and more collateral
show a longer debt maturity structure (at the 1% level).
Going beyond prior studies, we focus on how the extent of information asymmetry
affects short-term financing sources. Nevertheless, the choice between the two main
sources of short-term financing (bank debt and accounts payable) may be determined
by the existence of financial constraints in other sources of debt financing, as suggested
by the previous descriptive analyses. In order to examine this issue, we first analyze
the effects of information asymmetries on public debt, total bank debt, and long-
term bank debt. As seen in columns 2 and 3 of Table 6, we find that ASY has a
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Table 6 Effect of information asymmetry on different types of debt
SHTDBT PBLDBT BNKDBT LNGBNK SHTBNK ACCPAY TRDCRD
ASY 0.089*** −0.046** −0.099*** −0.039 −0.063*** 0.120*** 0.156***
(2.87) (−2.21) (−2.93) (−1.46) (−2.73) (4.49) (3.64)
LEV −0.327*** 0.115*** 0.200** 0.287*** −0.093 −0.198*** −0.087
(−4.30) (2.76) (2.08) (3.60) (−1.23) (−3.09) (−0.73)
SIZE 0.010 0.008 −0.049*** −0.014 −0.035*** 0.028*** 0.059***
(0.88) (1.01) (−3.96) (−1.45) (−3.75) (2.84) (4.09)
CFOTA 0.293** −0.054 −0.240 −0.108 −0.136 0.240** 0.357*
(2.23) (−0.88) (−1.61) (−1.14) (−1.15) (2.54) (1.78)
LAM −0.049*** 0.016 −0.030** −0.020
(−2.92) (1.00) (−2.03) (−1.27)
BTM −0.032 0.005 0.053** 0.022 0.031* −0.033* −0.036
(−1.38) (0.33) (2.07) (0.88) (1.90) (−1.96) (−1.44)
TANG −0.383*** 0.155*** 0.164* 0.219*** −0.026 −0.243*** −0.182*
(−4.64) (2.74) (1.89) (2.77) (−0.43) (−3.60) (−1.89)
Z −0.024 0.008 −0.035 0.022 −0.064*** 0.018 0.071**
(−0.91) (0.81) (−1.19) (0.87) (−3.74) (0.91) (2.14)
σ (ROA) 0.219 −0.342** 0.578 0.025 0.494* −0.415 −0.665
(0.73) (−2.32) (1.45) (0.09 (1.70) (−1.55) (−1.55)
Intercept 0.777*** −0.099 0.953*** 0.163 0.820*** −0.011 −0.229
(3.50) (−0.69) (4.41) (0.84) (4.43) (−0.06) (−0.86)
Indust. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.464 0.309 0.333 0.222 0.388 0.377 0.347
#obs. 542 542 542 542 542 542 542
This table reports OLS coefficients of the regression model (1), using different debt type ratios as dependent
variables, for the whole sample. Variable definitions are in Tables 1 and 3. The t statistics reported in
parentheses are based on Rogers standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** Denote significance
levels at two-tail tests of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively
significant and negative relationship with PBLDBT and BNKDBT (at the 5 and 1%
levels, respectively).8 These findings imply that those firms with more information
asymmetry have more difficulties to issue market debt and to access bank financing.
These findings are consistent with the evidence on US listed firms reported by Shen
(2014), which suggests that firms with high levels of information asymmetry lose
their access to the public debt market and have to rely on the private debt market. With
regard to long-term bank debt (column 4), the coefficient on ASY is negative and non-
significant at conventional levels in a two-tail test, although the negative association
8 When we break down public debt by maturity, we also find that our proxy of information asymmetry is
negatively associated with long-term and short-term public debt (at 10% level). We do not tabulate these
results for space reasons, but they are available upon request.
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between ASY and LNGBNK would be statistically significant at the 10% level in a
one-tail test.
Focusing on the short-term financing sources (columns 5 and 6), we observe that
the coefficient on ASY is negative and highly significant in the short-term bank debt
regression, whereas we find a positive association of ASY with ACCOPAY (at the 1%
level). These results are consistent with those in column 7, which indicate a positive
association between ASY and TRADCRD. In other words, firms with higher informa-
tion asymmetry have a higher proportion of trade credit over short-term bank financing
in their financial structure. Overall, our findings suggest that the financing provided by
suppliers increases when the level of information asymmetry of a firm is higher. Con-
sequently, trade credit seems to relieve the difficulties of firms that, as a consequence
of information asymmetries, face restrictions in their access to the capital market and
suffer credit rationing imposed by banks.9
With regard to control variables, we obtain results consistent with prior evidence
on financing determinants. Our findings show the relevance of collateral to obtain
certain financial resources. TANG, our proxy for the firm’s collateral, is statistically
significant in the majority of regressions. Prior research has reported a positive rela-
tionship between collateral and long-term debt (e.g. Bougheas et al. 2006), showing
that collateral is an important determinant in the granting of credit, particularly for
long-term loans conceded by financial institutions (e.g. Berger and Udell 1990). In
our case, TANG is positively associated with public debt and bank-debt, basically with
long-term bank debt, and negatively related to short-term debt and accounts payable.
Therefore, our results suggest that those firms with more levels of collateralizable
assets have more access to long-term financing and have less dependence on short-
term financing, especially on financing provided by suppliers.
According to Niskanen and Niskanen (2000), we also report that those firms with
higher levels of operating cash flows over total assets present higher levels of short-
term financing and trade credit. In addition, and consistent with Cuñat (1999) and
García-Teruel et al. (2010), among others, we also observe that more indebted firms
prefer long-term debt to short-term debt, but we additionally find that these firms
show higher levels of public debt and bank financing (in particular, long-term bank
debt) and lower levels of financing provided by suppliers. The coefficient on BTM
in the regression of BNKDBT is positive and significant at the 5% level. This result,
in line with previous evidence (e.g. Denis and Mihov 2003; De Andrés Alonso et al.
2005), suggests that firms with poorer expectations of value creation use more bank
debt. In other words, firms with profitable investment opportunities avoid this type of
financing since the bank supervision reduces the firm’s flexibility to take advantage of
their growth opportunities (De Andrés Alonso et al. 2005). Moreover, we observe that
larger firms reveal a greater presence of trade credit and less short-term bank financing.
Similarly, firms with higher financial strength also show less short-term bank debt, and
consequently, an increase in the proportion of trade credit in the short-term financing
sources.
9 We obtain the same results if we consider in TRADCRD all bank debt (short- and long-term), confirming
the substitution effect between bank debt and accounts payable.
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Additionally, we conduct the regression analyses above splitting the firms into two
groups according to SIZE. Panels A and B of Table 7 report the effects of information
asymmetry on firm short-term financing decisions for small and large firms, respec-
tively. The findings from the subsample of small firms are very similar to those of the
whole sample. The coefficients on ASY and their significance levels suggest that small
firms with greater informational asymmetries have shorter debt maturity, less access
to public debt and bank financing, and, consequently, they have to rely more on other
short-term non-bank financing sources, such as trade credit. Our findings seem to be
consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Biais and Gollier (1997) as they sug-
gest that those firms where asymmetric information generates credit rationing, such
as small firms, use more trade credit.
However, as seen in Panel B, the level of information asymmetry does not affect
SHTDBT, PBLDT, BNKDBT, LNGBNK, and ACCPAY for large firms. By contrast, we
observe that the coefficient on ASY is negative in the SHTBNK regression (significant
at the 10% level) and positive in the TRDCRD model (at the 5% level). Therefore,
although it is less clear than in the small firms group, we also observe that larger
firms that suffer higher levels of information asymmetry, the weight of trade credit
over short-term financing increases. In this case, this finding is due to information
asymmetries making the access to short-term bank debt more difficult, since we do not
find a significant association with the financing provided by suppliers. Therefore, our
findings suggest that financing decisions are less sensitive to information asymmetry
in larger listed firms, probably because in this type of firms the adverse selection
problem is less severe than in smaller listed-firms.
3.4 Robustness checks
We have implemented several sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our
results. One concern in our results is that they may be caused by some omitted factors.
For instance, as shown in Tables 2 and 4, firm’s size and age are both correlated
with information asymmetry, and size is also correlated with different types of debt.
Therefore, it could be that size and age are both correlated with asymmetric information
and debt financing, while there is no causal link between information asymmetry and
capital structure. Thus, in order to discard the possibility that factors, such as size and
age, could be causing our results, we have run regressions with growingly saturated
age and size controls.
Panel A of Table 8 shows the coefficients on ASY for different saturated versions
of model (1), where we have included polynomials on SIZE and Age. Since these
coefficients are quite stable from the simplest models to the more saturated models on
size and age, these findings suggest that ASY contains information beyond SIZE and
Age that is relevant for capital structure. In addition, we have performed two other
tests. First, we have orthogonalised SIZE and ASY, by regressing ASY on SIZE, and
taking the residuals as the part of ASY which is not explained by SIZE (r_ASY). Second,
we have regressed ASY on SIZE and Age, and we have taken the residuals as the part
of ASY which is not explained by SIZE and Age (z_ASY). Then, we include r_ASY or
z_ASY in the original model with size or size and age controls, respectively, instead
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Table 7 Effect of information asymmetry on different types of debt by size
SHTDBT PBLDBT BNKDBT LNGBNK SHTBNK ACCPAY TRDCRD
Panel A: Small firms
ASY 0.090** −0.018** −0.114** −0.051 −0.073 0.151*** 0.172***
(2.28) (−2.01) (−2.54) (−1.50) (−1.35) (5.04) (2.68)
LEV −0.365*** 0.033* 0.319*** 0.341*** −0.044 −0.198** −0.208*
(−4.16) (1.84) (2.93) (3.60) (−0.57) (−2.56) (−1.84)
SIZE 0.014 0.001 −0.052** 0.002 −0.056*** 0.051*** 0.081***
(0.91) (0.18) (−2.60) (0.14) (−2.73) (3.79) (3.64)
CFOTA 0.361*** −0.014 −0.215 −0.143 −0.082 0.278*** 0.321
(3.33) (−0.51) (−1.45) (−1.49) (−0.68) (3.08) (1.55)
LAM −0.043* 0.021 −0.053** 0.009
(−1.70) (1.05) (−2.62) (0.64)
BTM −0.032 −0.4 · 10−3 0.055* 0.023 0.031* −0.051*** −0.051***
(−1.24) (0.09) (1.80) (0.73) (1.76) (−2.82) (−2.00)
TANG −0.297** 0.051** 0.076 0.145 −0.005 −0.236*** −0.131
(−2.59) (2.13) (0.63) (1.39) (−0.05) (−2.78) (−1.00)
Z −0.031 0.004 −0.034 0.045* −0.098*** 0.050*** 0.088**
(−1.29) (0.53) (−1.06) (1.82) (−3.77) (2.83) (2.48)
σ (ROA) 0.431 −0.050 0.150 −0.216 0.192 −0.089 −0.325
(1.26) (−0.57) (0.29) (−0.58) (0.47) (−0.32) (−0.61)
Intercept 0.731*** 0.067 0.963*** −0.068 1.139*** −0.410** −0.493
(2.74) (0.87) (3.45) (−0.27) (3.86) (−2.24) (−1.48)
Indust. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.376 0.228 0.409 0.272 0.363 0.442 0.416
#obs. 271 271 271 271 271 271 271
Panel B: Large firms
ASY −0.020 0.003 −0.078 −0.020 −0.058* 0.022 0.143**
(−0.42) (0.07) (−1.17) (−0.40) (−1.88) (0.42) (2.06)
LEV 0.641** −0.042 −0.434 −0.028 −0.398** 0.442* 0.666
(2.44) (−0.18) (−1.07) (−0.10) (−2.28) (1.71) (1.45)
SIZE −0.034 0.027 −0.034 −0.023 −0.010 −0.023 0.020
(−1.43) (1.27) (−1.16) (−1.11) (−0.93) (−0.78) (0.65)
CFOTA −0.146 0.191 −0.496 −0.062 −0.440 −0.023 0.639
(−0.29) (0.96) (−1.17) (−0.16) (−1.47) (−0.06) (1.46)
LAM −0.049** 0.008 0.002 −0.053**
(−2.19) (0.27) (0.13) (−2.06)
BTM 0.007 −0.013 0.036 0.014 0.021 0.052 0.023
(0.17) (−0.28) (0.53) (0.33) (0.46) (1.34) (0.30)
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Table 7 continued
SHTDBT PBLDBT BNKDBT LNGBNK SHTBNK ACCPAY TRDCRD
TANG −0.333*** 0.242* 0.161 0.232* −0.094 −0.213* −0.192
(−3.21) (1.99) (1.16) (1.78) (−1.20) (−1.90) (−1.42)
Z 0.742*** −0.299** −0.278 −0.176 −0.090 0.481** 0.325
(3.55) (−2.03) (−0.98) (−0.86) (−0.67) (2.53) (1.00)
σ (ROA) 0.043 −0.276 0.700 0.185 0.534 −0.645 −0.568
(0.07) (−0.94) (1.19) (0.35) (1.31) (−1.18) (−0.95)
Intercept 0.563 −0.227 1.249** 0.586 0.643*** 0.244 −0.276
(1.40) (−0.57) (2.51) (1.50) (3.58) (0.61) (−0.58)
Indust. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.573 0.296 0.268 0.231 0.344 0.446 0.312
#obs. 271 271 271 271 271 271 271
This table reports OLS coefficients of the regression model (1), using different debt type ratios as dependent
variables, for small firms (Panel A) and large firms (Panel B). Variable definitions are in Tables 1 and 3.
The t statistics reported in parentheses are based on Rogers standard errors clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** Denote significance levels at two-tail tests of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively
Table 8 Coefficients on ASY for different versions of model (1)
SHTDBT PBLDBT BNKDBT LNGBNK SHTBNK ACCPAY TRDCRD
Panel A: Saturated model (1) on SIZE and Age
SIZE, Age 0.087*** −0.047** −0.098*** −0.037 −0.064*** 0.120*** 0.156***
SIZE, SIZE2,
Age, Age2
0.084*** −0.041** −0.086** −0.039 −0.050** 0.111*** 0.137***
SIZE, SIZE2,
SIZE3, Age,
0.089*** −0.045** −0.087** −0.044 −0.046** 0.110*** 0.134***
Age2Age3
Panel B: Model (1) with orthogonalized ASY
r_ASY 0.089*** −0.046** −0.099*** −0.039 −0.063*** 0.120*** 0.156***
z_ASY 0.087*** −0.047** −0.098*** −0.037 −0.064*** 0.120*** 0.156***
This table reports estimates for the coefficient on ASY in different versions of model (1). Panel A shows the
coefficients on ASY from regressions of model (1) with growingly saturated SIZE and Age controls. Panel
B reports the estimates for the coefficient on orthogonalized ASY in the model (1): r_ASY is the residuals
of the regression of ASY on SIZE and z_ASY is the residuals of the regression of ASY on SIZE and Age. ASY
is the composite index of information asymmetry based on market microstructure measures of information
asymmetry. SIZE is the logarithm of sales. Age is the logarithm of the numbers of years since the inception.
**, and *** Denote significance levels at two-tail tests of 5 and 1%, respectively, assessed with Rogers
standard errors clustered at the firm level
of our original ASY variable. The results, as shown in the Panel B of Table 8, are also
significant and the coefficients on r_ASY or z_ASY are very stable. Overall, all these
findings suggest that the effect of ASY on firm’s debt financing decisions is not caused
by firm size and age.
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We also addressed the possibility of reverse causality. Specifically, there are theo-
retical arguments to expect that the firm’s debt structure generates equity risk (in the
line of Modigliani-Miller’s Proposition II) that, in turn, may affect the constituents of
ASY. This argument mostly applies for total leverage (not considered in our study) and
it could be less relevant with respect to the composition of debt. To examine whether
the different types of debt affect equity risk, we regress idiosyncratic risk against each
one of our types of debt ratio controlling by variables identified in prior literature as
related to equity risk. Our findings (not tabulated) indicate that the debt type ratios
used as dependent variables in our paper do not significantly affect the equity risk and,
consequently, that our findings are not driven by this reverse causality concern.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we use an information asymmetry index based on measures developed by
market microstructure to investigate the association between information asymmetry
and the debt financing decisions of firms. For a sample of Spanish listed companies, we
document that as information asymmetry increases, firms shorten their debt maturity.
Similarly, we find that higher information asymmetry negatively affects public leverage
and bank debt, in particular short-term bank financing. In contrast, we observe a
positive relationship between information asymmetry and trade credit. These findings
suggest that firms with more information asymmetries face more restrictions in their
efforts to obtain financing from both public debt-market and banking entities, so they
are forced to turn to seeking finance from suppliers. Therefore, within short-term
financing sources, we document a higher (lower) use of trade credit (short-term bank
debt) as the level of information asymmetry increases.
We also show that the impact of information asymmetry on debt financing decisions
is moderated by firm size. The findings for the whole sample are mainly attributed to
small firms, which are those that face more problems relating to information asym-
metries. Thus, whereas in the small firm’s subsample we find evidence similar to that
of the whole sample in relation to debt maturity, public debt, bank debt and accounts
payable, we do not find this evidence in larger listed firms. This could be explained by
larger firms being characterized by a more transparent information environment that
diminishes the monitoring role of short-term debt and enhances the firm’s access to
broader financing sources. Nevertheless, in large firms we do find an increase in the
relative importance of trade credit within short-term financing sources as the degree of
information asymmetry increases. However, in this case this effect could be attributed
to the reduction in short-term bank debt, since the level of accounts payable is not
affected by information asymmetry.
Overall, our findings support those models framed within the information asymme-
try theories of trade credit, in which suppliers can relieve credit rationing suffered by
firms as a consequence of information asymmetries (e.g. Smith 1987; Biais and Gollier
1997; Burkart and Ellingsen 2004). Thus, our paper is in the line of prior empirical
research that shows that firms which are financially constrained and rationed in the
credit market use trade credit from their suppliers to a greater extent (e.g. Petersen and
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Rajan 1997; Nilsen 2002; Danielson and Scott 2004; Cuñat 2007; Garcia-Appendini
and Montoriol-Garriga 2013).
Our study contributes to the literature on the effects of information asymmetry on
financing decisions, and in particular on the role played by trade credit and suppli-
ers under financial restrictions. Considerable empirical evidence exists concerning this
topic, fundamentally focused on small and medium sized firms. However, the informa-
tion asymmetry theories of trade credit have scarcely been investigated on listed firms.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no similar studies examining the composition of
short-term financing for Spanish listed firms. Prior studies regarding the Spanish listed
firms’ financing have focused on the determinants of capital structure and debt maturity
(e.g. Cuñat 1999; De Andrés Alonso et al. 2005; García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano
2010; García-Teruel et al. 2010) as well as the use of bank debt (Ojah and Manrique
2005; Saona and Vallelado 2010). We also extend the recent literature about infor-
mation asymmetry and capital structure using market microstructure-based measures
of information asymmetry (e.g. Bharath et al. 2009; Gao and Zhu 2015; Shen 2014;
Petacchi 2015). Our study is the first paper that uses these types of proxies to analyze
if trade credit is used to circumvent the financial restrictions imposed by information
asymmetries. Market microstructure proxies may be more appropriate for measuring
information asymmetries suffered by a listed firm, since the traditional measures from
corporate finance literature (such as firm size, age, growth-opportunities, etc.) may be
capturing other details not directly related to information asymmetry, especially in the
case of large firms, such as those listed on a stock market.
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